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XXXDRAFT 4/16/21
Constitutional Review of Federal Tax Legislation
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1
Yoseph M. Edrey2
ABSTRACT
What does the Constitution mean when it says that “The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States” (US Const. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1)?
The definition of “tax” for constitutional purposes has become important in light of the
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, in which Chief Justice Roberts for the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act under the
taxing power. This has led to commentators questioning the utility of Roberts’ distinction
between a “tax” (where Congress’ power is almost unlimited) and a “regulation” (where
Congress’ power under the Commerce Cause is limited).
We should make a very clear note at the outset: Tax law is a too broad term. It includes both
provisions intended at raising revenue and provisions intended to regulate behavior. Personal
income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT) and even value added tax (VAT) laws include both
type of provisions. Using the distinction that Prof. Stanley Surrey has proposed about 60 years
ago, tax legislation includes both types of provisions; those that aimed at raising revenue in
accordance with the tax base, and regulatory provisions as well ("tax expenditures"). In other
words, almost any tax legislation includes both aspects. Hence referring to PIT means its base,
and not necessarily all its code provisions. The purpose of this article is to draw this distinction
and to use it for basic guidelines for constitutional judicial review over tax legislation.
We would propose a different distinction. A “tax” for purposes of the Taxing Clause is a pure
tax, namely a tax implemented “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States”, i.e., a tax intended primarily to raise revenues in order to
finance the elected government’s policy and its implementation. In addition, a progressive
“income tax” for purposes of the Sixteenth Amendment is a tax intended for redistribution of
wealth from the rich to the poor. We do not address redistributive tax provisions (like the
progressivity feature of PIT or a wealth tax) further, beyond noting that they are inherently
political and therefore their distributive function (reducing inequality) should not be subject to
judicial review.
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Even a pure tax has constitutional limits, but they are relatively few. It should be emphasized
though, that the traditional basses for constitutional judicial review - such as discrimination on
the basis of gender, race, or sexual orientation, are applied to tax legislation in a very limited
way. As noted already, one could detect the Supreme Court’s significant reluctance to review
tax legislation in the US on constitutional grounds, although one could also argue that a tax
provision that has disparate impact on racial or gender grounds (or other protected category)
should be evaluated using struct scrutiny (as some provisions involving gender have in fact been
evaluated by lower courts).
This should be distinguished from a regulatory tax legislation, i.e., tax legislation whose main
purpose is not to raise revenue but to change taxpayer behavior. Regulatory taxes include
Pigouvian taxes (e.g., tobacco taxes and carbon taxes) designed to reduce negative externalities
and tax expenditures (deviations from a normative tax base, which we name negative Pigouvian
taxes, since their purpose is to treat favorably taxpayers who create positive externalities).
Regulatory Tax legislation should be subject to constitutional review under various clauses of
the Constitution including the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the
Establishment Clause, and the limits on the Commerce Clause.
The penalty imposed by the individual mandate of the ACA, which was repealed in 2017, was a
regulatory tax (i.e., not a pure tax) and therefore (contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’ view)
subject to the limits on Congressional power under the Commerce Clause (although in our
opinion the individual mandate should have been upheld as consistent with these limits, per
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion).
Any actual tax rule/legislation has more than one purpose. All tax rules influence behavior, and
therefore come within our definition of regulatory taxes, and all taxes produce some revenue,
and therefore come within our definition of pure taxes. But some taxes are primarily regulatory
(e.g., Pigouvian taxes aimed to deal with negative externalities) and tax expenditures (deviation from a

normative tax base which we name them Negative piguvian taxes since their purpose is to treat favorably
taxpayers who create positive externalities) while others are primarily for revenue (e.g., VAT) . Other

taxes have multiple purposes (e.g., corporate income tax, CIT, which has revenue and (as well
as regulatory aims). Moreover, any given tax may have multiple provisions with different aims
(e.g., the many tax expenditures embedded within PIT and CIT).

When evaluating the constitutionality of any given tax provision, a court should first classify it
as either a pure tax provision or a regulatory tax provision. If it is the former, the court should
generally hold that it is constitutional under the Taxing Clause. If it is the latter, the court should
evaluate it against the limits imposed by the rest of the Constitution.
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1. Introduction
The Constitution provides that “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States”.3 In NFIB vs. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts (for a 5-4 majority of the
Court) relied on this “Taxing Clause” to uphold the constitutionality of the individual mandate
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) because the ACA imposed a penalty on
individuals who did not purchase health insurance, which in the Court’s opinion exceeded the
limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause power to regulate interstate commerce.4 As a result,
when Congress in 2017 eliminated the penalty, this raised doubts on the constitutionality of the
individual mandate (and potentially the ACA in its entirety) which are now again before the
Court.5
Roberts held the penalty to be a “tax” because it was not coercive, was embedded in the tax
code and enforced by the IRS.6 But as many commentators have pointed out, this distinction
between a tax and a penalty is not persuasive. Kyle Logue, for example, has suggested that
every mandatory payment is a “tax” (even if paid to a private party, like an insurance premium,
while regulatory taxes are not taxes but regulations.7
We do not agree with this classification, because in our opinion “tax” from a constitutional
perspective must be restricted to payments to the government (as the Taxing Clause states,
because only such payments can help “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States.”) But that still leaves unanswered the basic question

3

US Const. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 (the “Taxing Clause”).
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
5
Texas v. California, US Supreme Court Docket No. 10-1019 (argued Nov. 10, 2020).
6
NFIB v. Sebelius, supra.
7
Kyle D. Logue, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Individual Mandate: Thoughts on the Tax/Regulation Distinction, 5
MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 173 (2016); see also Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To
Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 88 (2012) (citations omitted) (“To some, Chief Justice Roberts’s argument for
sustaining the individual mandate as a tax seemed to come out of nowhere. The Court received a total of 156 briefs
related to the case, but only ten contained more than a passing discussion of the tax power argument, and the
government devoted only fifteen pages to it. Though raised throughout the litigation, the tax power argument was
repeatedly rejected or not reached below and received only passing expressions of support. Nor did the Court itself
seem to show much interest; the question of whether the mandate represented an exercise of the tax power received
less than fourteen minutes of sustained discussion at oral argument.”) For early advocacy of the Taxing Clause as
the basis for the constitutionality of the individual mandate see, e.g., Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the
Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 120 YALE L. J. ONLINE 27 (2010),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/conditional-taxation-and-the-constitutionality-of-health- care-reform; Robert D.
Cooter & Neil S. Seigel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195
(2012).
4
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of how to distinguish a “tax” that is presumptively constitutional under the Taxing Clause from
a “regulation” that is subject to limitation under the rest of the Constitution.
We would propose the following distinction.8 A “tax” for purposes of the Taxing Clause is a pure
tax, namely a tax implemented for raising revenue for the government “to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States”. Even a pure tax has
constitutional limits, but they are relatively few.9 This should be distinguished from a regulatory
tax, i.e., a tax whose main purpose is not to raise revenue but to change taxpayer behavior.
Regulatory taxes include Pigouvian taxes (e.g., taxes on tobacco products or carbon taxes)
designed to reduce negative externalities and tax expenditures (deviations from a normative
tax base which in essence are negative Pigouvian taxes. Regulatory taxes should be subject to
constitutional review under various clauses of the Constitution including the Due Process
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the limits on congressional power under the
Commerce Clause, and the establishment clause.10 The penalty imposed by the individual
mandate of the ACA, which was repealed in 2017, was a regulatory tax and therefore (contrary
to Chief Justice Roberts’ view) potentially subject to the limits of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.11

8

Admittedly, such a distinction has almost no basis in the Court’s existing precedents; as discussed infra, the Court
has generally evaluated all payments labeled “taxes” that raise any revenue as subject only to the relatively weak
limits of the Taxing Clause. But this approach raises its own problems because it encourages Congress to use the tax
code for regulatory purposes, primarily through “tax expenditures” (i.e., deviations from a normative tax base). See
discussion infra. For an excellent discussion of the Court’s existing precedents on federal taxes and the Constitution
see generally Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Supreme Court, Federal Taxation, and the Constitution (ABA, 2013). As
for the other terms in the Taxing Clause, imposts are taxes on exports (which are separately prohibited under Article
I, Section 9, Clause 5), duties are taxes on imports, and excises are taxes on domestic products. Imposts, duties and
excises were the main sources of federal revenue before 1913 and should be regarded primarily as pure taxes, not
regulatory taxes, even if they had the effect of reducing the consumption of the items they were imposed on, as well
as (in the case of duties) protecting domestic industries. They also had a strong regressive distributive effect. There
is one clause of the Constitution, however, in which the Court does draw a distinction between taxes intended to
raise revenue and other taxes, and that is the Origination Clause. See, e.g., Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906)
(“Revenue bills, within the meaning of the constitutional provision that they must originate in the House of
Representatives and not in the Senate, are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for
other purposes which may incidentally create revenue”); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
9
For a discussion of the appropriate limits on pure taxes see part 3 infra. For a similar distinction in the tax treaty
context see Fadi Shaheen, Income Tax Treaty Aspects of Nonincome Taxes: The Importance of Residence, 73 Tax
L Rev 583, 606-609 (2018).
10
For a discussion of the appropriate limits on regulatory taxes see part 4 infra.
11
As far as the Internal Revenue Code (26 USC, IRC) is concerned, we would classify only part I, sections 1
(determining rates of tax for the PIT) and 61-63 (defining gross income, adjusted gross income, and taxable income)
and the payroll tax as pure, while everything else is regulatory, including the entire CIT (because even the rate
structure is regulatory and the revenue raised is incidental, while the distributive aspect is unclear). See Reuven AviYonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193 (2004). We
would also classify the rest of the IRC as regulatory, since the main purpose of the estate tax is not to raise revenue
but to limit dynastic wealth because of its anti-democratic implications (a negative externality) and to incentivize the
rich to donate to charity, and the other taxes are excises which are Pigouvian in nature. See also Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation (Review of Slemrod, Does Atlas Shrug? The
Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich), 111 Yale L J 1391 (2002).
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Any actual tax has more than one purpose.12 All taxes influence behavior, and therefore come
within our definition of regulatory taxes, and all taxes produce some revenue and effect some
redistribution, and therefore come within our definition of pure taxes. But some taxes are
primarily regulatory (e.g., Pigouvian taxes) while others are primarily for revenue (e.g., Value
Added Tax, VAT). Other taxes have multiple purposes (e.g., corporate income tax, CIT, which
has revenue as well as regulatory aims). Moreover, any given tax may have multiple provisions
with different aims (e.g., the many tax expenditures embedded within PIT and CIT).13
When evaluating the constitutionality of any given tax provision, a court should first classify it
as either a pure tax provision or a regulatory tax provision. If it is the former, the court should
generally hold that it is constitutional under the Taxing Clause. If it is the latter, the court should
evaluate it against the limits imposed by the rest of the Constitution.
We want to clarify up front that we are not envisaging this analysis as a practical proposal for
adoption by the Supreme Court. As one of us concluded elsewhere, the current Court is not up
to the task of constitutional review of tax legislation, since it botches even regular statutory
review because it is dominated by textualists who refuse to consider legislative purpose.14 Our
goal instead is to try to imagine what constitutional limits might apply to tax legislation in an
ideal world, and then consider how they might have some practical implication for example on
how Congress approaches drafting such legislation. For example, if the Joint Committee on
Taxation would evaluate tax proposals not just on revenue grounds, but in the case of
regulatory taxes also in terms of their impact on horizontal equity (equal protection).
The same analysis should be used when it comes to tax incentives. Congress must make an
effort and calculate what is the economic advantage the public gains from the activities the
government seeks to encourage. If the tax relief rate is higher than the benefit that will be
generated for the public, we will be in a situation where the firms which will be entitled to the
incentives are treated favorably compared to other firms who do not enjoy the tax relief. Such a
legislative process would surely serve the public's constitutional right to information, prevent
distortion of the voter's will and lead to efficiency in the fiscal activity of the government.as a
result, this may incline some lawmakers to be less receptive to the pressure from lobbyists to
enact new tax expenditures to favor their special interests.
In what follows, we will first define pure taxes and regulatory taxes (part 2). We will then
discuss the constitutional limits on pure taxes (part 3) and on regulatory taxes, including tax
expenditures (part 4). Part 5 concludes.
12

See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 US 506, 513 (1937): “Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some
extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed. But a tax is not
any less a tax because it has a regulatory effect.” See also Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 US 725, 741 n. 12
(1974); NFIB v. Sebelius, supra at 2566 (“Every tax is to some extent regulatory”).
13
See generally Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2007).
14
Reuven Avi-Yonah, SHOULD US TAX LAW BE CONSTITUTIONALIZED? CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS
ON EISNER V. MACOMBER (1920), Duke J. Con. L. Pub. Pol’y (2021).
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2. Defining Pure vs. Regulatory Taxes
A pure tax is a tax imposed for the purpose of either raising revenue in order to finance the
implantation of the elected government's fiscal policy.. A regulatory tax legislation is a tax
imposed for the purpose of changing individual behavior.
In essence, regulatory tax legislation aims to improve the free market economy and regulate
commercial activity by transferring the damages created by a particular activity (negative
externality) from the injured party to the creator of the damage; or to transfer the benefits
generated from a desirable activity (positive externality) from the beneficiary (usually the
general public) to the firm who create the activity and causes the benefit.
For example: If Congress seeks to impose a Pigouvian tax on tobacco, it must receive a
significant accurate evaluation of the amount of damage the public suffers from the smoking,
and accordingly calculate the amount of tax/mandatory payment on cigarettes. In case the total
amount to be collected from the manufacturers or smokers is higher than the total damage to
the public, it means that it is discriminatory – nonsmokers do not pay this tax; or a penalty
imposed without due process.
The same analysis should be use when it comes to tax incentives. Congress must make an effort
and calculate what is the economic advantage the public gains from the activities the
government seeks to encourage. If the tax relief rate is higher than the benefit that will be
generated for the public, we will be in a situation where the firms which will be entitled to the
incentives are treated favorably compared to other firms who do not enjoy the tax relief.
Such a legislative procedure would surely serve the public's constitutional right to information,
prevent distortion of the voter's will and lead to efficiency in the fiscal activity of the
government.
All tax expenditures, i.e., departures from a normative tax base such as the Haig-Simons
definition of income as the sum of consumption and savings, are regulatory (negative) taxes.15
15

Tax expenditures are defined in the tax expenditure budget, see Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law
93–344). For the most recent tax expenditure budget see See Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Tax Expenditures (2018) (for Fiscal Year 2020). The concept was invented by Stanley Surrey in the 1960s. See, e.g.,
Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (1973); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R.
McDaniel, Tax Expenditures (1978). See also Paul R. McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Expenditures: How to
Identify Them; How to Control Them, 15 Tax Notes 595 (1982); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The
Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 Harv. L. Rev.
352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Government Assistance: The Choice Between Direct Programs and Tax
Expenditures, 8 Tax Notes 507 (Apr. 30, 1979); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1970); Stanley S.
Surrey, Tax Subsidies as a Device for Implementing Government Policy, 3 Tax Adviser 196 (1972); Stanley S.
Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget – Response to Professor Bittker, 22 Nat’l Tax J. 528,
537 (1969); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of
1974, 17 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 679 (1976); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure
Concept and the Legislative Process, in The Economics of Taxation 123 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds.,
1980); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging

6
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/175
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3771017

6

Avi-Yonah and Edrey:

While it could be argued that tax expenditures are merely subsidies and therefore subject to
minimal (rational basis) constitutional review, the decision to enact discriminatory legislation as
a tax expenditure rather than a subsidy has significant implications for both congressional
procedure and political salience that justify subjecting tax expenditure to a more rigorous
constitutional review than subsidies.16
In reality, there is no such thing as a pure “pure tax” or a pure “regulatory tax.” All real taxes
have elements of both. The “purest” tax is a head tax, imposed at the same rate on every
individual member of a given society. Economists like head taxes because they arguably do not
influence behavior and are therefore efficient (do not create deadweight loss). However, as
long as we have more than one taxing jurisdiction, even a head tax can induce individuals to
leave, thereby having an inadvertent regulatory element. At the other extreme, Pigouvian
taxes, which are designed to reduce negative externalities from e.g. smoking or pollution,
always produce some revenue (when they fail to sufficiently change. Tax expenditures by
definition do not raise revenue. Our main taxes, the PIT and CIT, have a mixture of pure and
regulatory elements in them. VAT, which is the most important tax outside the US, is primarily
for revenue, but it also has regulatory effects (especially since real VATs always have
exemptions and multiple rates). In general, the distinction between pure and regulatory taxes
should be made provision by provision, and not for any given tax as a whole.
Despite the fact that any real tax has both pure and regulatory elements, it is important from a
constitutional perspective to distinguish between pure and regulatory tax provisions, because
the former should in our opinion be subject only to the Taxing Clause and therefore Congress’
power is relatively unlimited, while the latter should be subject to all the other limits of the
Constitution, namely the ones established by the Commerce Clause but also potentially the
Equal Protection, Establishment and other Clauses. In what follows, we will first discuss the
constitutional limits on pure taxes and then on regulatory taxes.
3. The Constitutional Limits on Pure Taxes

Issues, 20 B.C. L. Rev. 225 (1979). For the subsequent literature, see also Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A
Reassessment, Duke L.J. 1155 (1988); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 Yale L.J. 1165 (1993). In particular, see J. Clifton
Fleming & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27 Va. Tax
Rev. 437 (2008) [hereinafter Fleming & Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis]; J. Clifton Fleming &
Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative Tax Base? A Critique of the “New
Paradigm” and Its Denouement, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 135 (2010). The concept has also drawn significant criticism. See,
e.g., Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis 39, 47
(Comm. Print 2008); Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 Tax Notes 413, 414
(2001); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969);
Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 Tax Notes 1661, 1662–63
(1992); Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax L. Rev. 187, 201–02 (2004);
David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L.J. 955, 976
(2004).
16
Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Expenditure Framework Legislation (USC Law, Legal Studies Paper No. 10-1, 2013).
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The Constitution itself imposes very few limits on the taxing power, Unless it is clear that it is
not possible to impose taxes that are not intended to pay the Debts and provide for the
Common Defense and General Welfare of the United States ”. Goods exported from a State
may not be taxed.17 Direct taxes must be apportioned among the states by population18 and
indirect taxes must be uniform.19 The only significantly disputed item is the definition of
“direct” tax, which in Pollock (1895) led to the Court striking down the second US income tax as
unconstitutional, but this decision was reversed by the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment
in 1913.20 There is still some debate among scholars about whether an unapportioned federal
wealth tax would be constitutional.21
Nor has the Supreme Court22 imposed significant limits on the power of Congress under the
Taxing Clause. The Court has emphasized the sweeping character of this power by saying from
time to time that it “reaches every subject,”23 that it is “exhaustive”24 or that it “embraces
every conceivable power of taxation.”25 The few subject matter limitations imposed in the past
have been overruled.26 Most strikingly, since 1920 the Court has refused to rule any federal
income tax statute unconstitutional.27
17

US Const. Article I, Section 9, Clause 5: No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
US Const. Article I, Section 9, Clause 4: No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to
the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
19
US Const. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1: all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.
20
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), affirmed on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
21
See, e.g., Ari Glogower, A Constitutional Wealth Tax, 118 MICH. L. REV. 717 (2020); for supporters of
constitutionality see, e .g ., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 56–
58 (1999); Calvin H. Johnson, Purging Out Pollock: The Constitutionality of Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97
TAX NOTES 1723, 1728–29, 1734 (2002). For opponents see, e .g ., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The
Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, in WEALTH 261, 284–85 (Jack Knight & Melissa Schwartzberg eds., 2017);
Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 829 (2003). See also Eric Rakowski,
Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 270 (2000) (“A court might reasonably decide the issue
either way, depending upon the theory of constitutional interpretation it embraced and its conception of the weight
and point of relevant precedents.”). Sebelius reaffirmed that the only “direct” taxes are poll taxes and taxes on land
values. NFIB v. Sebelius, supra.
22
Some lower courts contemplated constitutionl rev – e.g. Murphy v. IRS in D.C. (before the rehearing…) See also
Erik M. Jensen, "Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses" journal of Law & Politics
[Vol XV:687](2006
23
License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867).
24
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)
25
240 U.S. at 12.
26
In Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) and Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925), the Court held that the
inclusion of the salaries received by federal judges in measuring the liability for a nondiscriminatory income tax
violated the constitutional mandate that the compensation of such judges should not be diminished during their
continuance in office, but this result was repudiated in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939). The ruling of
Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871) that the salary of a state officer is immune to federal income
taxation also has been overruled in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) . Most limits on
taxation of state interests have been overturned as well. See, e.g., Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U.S. 249, 254 (1903) and
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
27
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189 (1920). See Reuven Avi-Yonah, SHOULD US TAX LAW BE
CONSTITUTIONALIZED? CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON EISNER V. MACOMBER (1920), Duke J. Con.
L. Pub. Pol’y (2021).
What about Murphy?
18
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In our opinion, even pure taxes should have some constitutional limits, derived from the
combination of the Taxing Clause’s admonition that taxes should be imposed only “to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States” (for
revenue) and the Sixteenth Amendment’s approval of PIT (for redistribution, as was generally
understood when the Amendment was adopted28). In addition, the understanding of the Taxing
Clause should be informed by the fact that the American Revolution was fought under the
slogan “no taxation without representation.”
a. What is a Pure Tax?
In order to understand the limits of the taxing power, it is necessary to discuss the fundamental
purposes of pure taxes.
Most of the definitions of the term “tax” share the following basic characteristics:
“unrequited/not reciprocated mandatory payments collected primarily by the central
government.” Lawyers tend to emphasize the fact that the taxpayer does not receive direct and
equal consideration in return for her payments. This insight reflects a slight confusion between
the substance/fundamental role of taxes and the “technical” aspect of tax collection. From the
substantive point of view taxes are justified by the benefit principle (i.e., that taxpayers benefit
from the use of the revenues) and based on consent. The theoretical assumption must be, then,
that taxpayers do receive full quid pro quo consideration through the public goods and services
the elected government provides, such as law and order, national defense, a stable economic
system, physical and social infrastructure, a civilized and organized society and a workable and
enforceable legal system. Hence, taxes (from the Latin taxare= to estimate) are supposed to
serve as the estimated price of such public goods and services consumed by taxpayers. The fact
that tax is an enforced contribution exacted pursuant to legislative authority, is a reflection of
the need to collect taxes efficiently, due to an unfortunate human phenomenon known as free
riders, i.e., those members of the community who try to take advantage of the fact that they
can enjoy public goods and services without sharing their cost.
As in the private market, any purchase of goods or services entails a legal obligation to pay their
price. This basic rule should be applied for both private and public goods and services, bought
either in the private market, or from the elected government. In other words, taxes are based
on the benefit principle. This benefit we, the taxpayers, enjoy both as firms and as income
producers, and as households who use the income and consume public goods and services. As
firms and income producers, public goods and services enable us to produce income and
wealth. Without government, which provides goods, services and enables social capital as a
factor of production29 we would not be able to function, to operate and to produce our income.
28

????
See inter alia GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (1964); Robert M. Solow A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth 70 Q. J.
ECON. 65 (1956) ; Natalie Gochnour Utah’s Economic Exceptionalism, American Affairs Volume IV, Number 4
(Winter 2020): 46–62

29
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In other words, our economic production is a common/joint activity of a partnership with the
public. The public invests in physical and social infrastructure and through the government
enables and maintains the domestic social capital, which provides the economic conditions that
allow the partnership to function, operate successfully and achieve its economic goals. We refer
to this concept as the “joint project approach”. As all the other "partners" of the "joint project"
who own factors of production, the public, through its government, is entitled to its return on
its investment. In other words, tax is a profit sharing mechanism between the public and the
rest of the investors – fiscal, human and social capital. 30
The other aspect of the benefit justification focuses on us as households, and the consumption
side, which has two aspects; the current or future consumption of private goods and services,
which is possible only in an organized and civilized society, with functional markets and
regulated and efficient financial institutions. In addition, we also consume directly public good
and services, such as national and domestic defense, recognition of private property and its
protection, social and legal order, national pride etc. Those goods and services cost money and
we have to pay for them. When the provider is the public/government, the payment goes to
the public coffers through the tax system in order to cover the provider’s costs. In addition, as is
discussed below, the pricing process in a free market of the private goods and services is not
substantially different from the way the public goods’ prices are set in a democratic society.
Hence, from a philosophical, economic, and social point of view we define a pure tax under the
Taxing Clause, in a democratic society as, a mandatory payment collected by law in exchange
for goods and services the elected government provides to the public, directed to the general
budget without pre-apportionment for a particular or specific purpose.
Note that the “mandatory” aspect is part of the definition only for two reasons: The “free rider”
phenomenon, and the fact that public goods and services are not bought by the taxpayers by
individual decisions and choices. Such definition insists that a pure tax’s purpose is just to
finance the elected government’ general budget in order to execute its stated policy while it is
not designated in advance for any specific goal. Other mandatory payments, such as user fees
and duties on the one hand, and regulatory taxes on the other hand, are not within such a
definition. As is discussed above, the distinction between pure taxes and regulatory taxes has a
significant meaning regarding constitutional judicial review and the public participation in
democratic deliberation.
b. The Legal Definition
For practical reasons, the legal definition of taxation in a democratic society has a small but
necessary addition: a mandatory payment collected by law, which is assumed to be in
exchange for goods and services the elected government provides to the public, directed to
the general budget without pre-apportionment for a particular or specific purpose. The
30

Yoseph M. Edrey “Constitutional Review and Tax Law: An Analytical Framework”, 56 American University Law
Rev. Volume 56 (2007); Yoseph M. Edrey IBinyroduction to the theory of taxation (Hebrew, 2008).
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rationale for this addition - the assumption - derives from the concept that the taxes are based
on consent. Yet, it is quite difficult for the government to provide solid legal evidence that it
provides a full consideration for each and every member of the society. Hence, we need the
assumption that the consideration is fulfilled/provided by the government. The burden of proof
is shifted to the taxpayers. In case a taxpayer - or a group - argue that they do not receive a
quid pro quo for their tax payments and therefore, do not consent to pay the tax, they bear a
very heavy burden. In rare cases, however, this burden is not impossible to bear.
Already in 1938 the Supreme Court offered the following concept:
“Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes
by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in
some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens” (Welch v.
Henry et al, 305 US 134 at pp. 146-7).
A careful analysis of this language reveals three components. First, the purpose of a tax is to
finance the elected government’s expenses according to the benefit principle. Second, the
obligation to pay the tax is not based on a contractual relationship. Third, tax should not be
used as a punishment.
The first and the third components go hand in hand with the definition of the term pure tax, as
discussed above. The second one might be considered contradictory to our approach, which
bases tax on consent, but we do not think it is fundamentally inconsistent with it since there is
not a formal contract involved. Maybe we should add a short discussion re "Social contract", i.e.
philosophical contractual non formal legal relationship?
Here it is worth noting a certain ambiguity. A common view is that personal tax - income tax - is
imposed on economic capacity. As we have clarified above, this view is erroneous. The tax is
levied on the enjoyment of public services. Economic capacity is an effective and useful
measure of enjoyment. The explanation for this is already found in the words of Adam Smith
In other words, a person's degree of enjoyment of public services is measured in accordance
with his economic capacity. The higher the economic capacity, the greater the degree of
enjoyment. when the government provides security services, those taxpayers with higher
ability are willing to pay, obviously, much more than those with low ability: The former have
much more to lose in case there will be no security services that enable them to keep their
property safe and secured. The latter are willing to pay much less because their property is
small, if at all. The same goes with expenses paid for public education, transportation, national
pride, sending rockets to the moon or the national team to the Olympic games.
c. Pure Tax Legislation, Constitutional Law and the threats to Human Rights
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Pure tax legislation raises two major constitutional issues: 1) The power/authority to levy taxes.
2) The substance and the quality of the tax laws, their compliance with constitutional principles
and the degree of possible infringement of such principles.
i.

The Power to Lay Taxes

As stated above, Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution describes the general power of the
Congress in terms of tax laws as follows:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States…(emphasis added).
The traditional approach, expressed by the Supreme Court, is that “the public funds may be
appropriated 'to provide for the general welfare of the United States.' …While, therefore, the
power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the clause which confers it,” [United States
v. Butler]. A broad interpretation is that in practice, the power to tax is indeed unlimited; one
may argue that it is impossible to provide evidence that a tax’s revenue which is spent by the
government, does not provide for the general welfare of the United States. (one may wonder if
the Trump administration complies with such an assumption, as well as with Nethnyaue……
However, based on some insights and doctrines, which were developed for the last half
a century in the field of public finance – known as “optimal taxation”31:
"One of the major developments of the last fifty years is the widespread
application of rigorous empirical methods to analyze the efficiency of the tax
system. Empirical work not only assists the formation and analysis of economic
policy but also plays a critical role in distinguishing important from less
important theoretical considerations, thereby contributing to further
theoretical development. Properly executed, empirical analysis is not only
consistent with the welfare theory that underlies normative public finance, but
also takes the theory further by testing its implications and offering reliable
measurement of parameters that are critical to the assessment of tax
systems".32
A most important corollary of this doctrine is that any tax has a deadweight loss, meaning that
the amount of the loss of the general welfare is greater than the tax’s revenue which the
government collects. Hence, the government has to be efficient enough in order to provide a
greater amount of welfare than the deadweight loss, otherwise the assumption regarding the
31

See, inter akia the corner ston pf this doctrine: Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees Optimal Taxation and Public
Production I: Production Efficiency 61 The American Economic Review, 8 (1971).
32
Alan J.Auerbach and James R.Hines Jr., Taxation and Economic Efficiency Handbook of Public Economics
(Volume 3, 2002), Chapter 21 pp 1347-1421
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public consent to pay taxes and the constitutional requirement of the general welfare of the
United States does not hold. (Who consents to pay any price and receives in return a smaller
amount of welfare? How can a court justify a tax that is not with accordance to one out of two
goals set by the Constitution?). In other word, an inefficient government may levy unconstitutional taxes.
Section 9 of Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution states:
"No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken".
Consequently, when Congress legislated the second income tax in the United States (after the
civil war income tax, which was upheld as constitutional but expired in 1872), it was held invalid
by the Supreme Court (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 1895). The Court ruled that
a particular type of income tax (a tax on income derived from property) was actually a direct tax
and had to be levied in proportion to each state's population. After a prolonged political
debate, the response was the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
approved by Congress in 1909 and ratified in 1913, which removed the requirement that taxes
on income have to be apportioned by population and provided that:
“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration.”
Note that some scholars have argued that the power of the Congress to tax income derives
from the Taxing Clause and not from the Sixteenth Amendment, which only removed the
apportionment requirement from income tax (if it is a direct tax at all). The traditional belief is
that the specific wording of the Amendment left the apportionment to apply to other direct
taxes (including capitation and real-estate taxes, and maybe a wealth tax). Such a belief ignores
economic analyses, which indicate that income, wealth, property and consumption have much
more in common than envisioned in 1913 (or in 1787). Other scholars have argued strongly that
the term “direct tax” in the Constitution does not preclude Congress from levying anything
other than a head tax or a real estate tax, because the Supreme Court which was composed of
drafters of the Constitution approved of Alexander Hamilton’s tax on carriages in 1796.
ii. Substantive Judicial Review of Pure Tax Legislation
1) The Limitations on the Power to Tax
Our approach is that a mere labeling of an act as “tax”, or a receipt as “income”, or a payment
as a “penalty”, should not change the standards of constitutional judicial review. Furthermore,
if labeling a regulatory act as a “tax”, which is under the umbrella of the Sixteenth Amendment,
provides a quasi-immunity from judicial review, then policymakers, who prefer to avoid judicial
review, would rather promote their policy by using tax expenditures (TE) as a regulatory tool
13
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instead of using other – direct and more appropriate – means. Thus, the courts' reluctance to
perform judicial review over tax legislation may produce two undesired consequences. First,
discriminatory laws, which probably won’t survive judicial review if enacted as non-fiscal
legislation, enjoy the “quasi immunity” reserved for “tax law”. Second, such legislation causes
the tax code to become complicated, obscure and detracts it from its true and designated goals
- to finance the expenses of the elected government. As is discussed below, in most cases such
situation serves the interests of the powerful groups and sectors and as a result the tax system
becomes regressive; TE entail economic distortions, lack of public supervision on the
government, a hidden process of privatization of the government chores, increased social gaps
and eventually lead to inefficiency.33
Thus, our claim is that the term tax in the Taxing Clause should be very clear and narrow (i.e.,
limited to pure taxes) and, like any other legislation, pure taxes have to comply with the
constitutional limitations imposed upon the legislature by the Constitution. Any statutory
provision of Tax legislation (both primary and secondary) may be declared void, if it is used
exclusively to punish or to ban an activity, or if it is too harsh and oppressive. However, even if
the tax deprives taxpayers of their property, it is not a “taking” for Fifth Amendment purposes.
The aggregate private property is the common-collective property of the community’s
members. Reality teaches that today, the real threat to private property is that small but
influential groups that covet the collective private property more than the government might
violate this constitutional right.
Note, however, that we do not argue that the courts should review and question the elected
government’s policy that underlies the reviewed tax law, but focus solely on making sure that
while the elected government applies its policy it respects and obeys the constitutional
guidelines. In particular, the tax rate schedule, which embodies the distributive aims of PIT and
CIT, is subject to democratic debate in every US election, and should therefore be immune from
constitutional review even if the tax rate is very high (e.g., the 94% top PIT rate in the 1940s50s, and the 80% CIT excess profits tax rate in the 1940s). Unless the consent assumption is
inconceivable under certain circumstances.
Tax legislation may violate constitutional principles in various ways: If a tax is not for the
common defense and general welfare; If it violates the basic principles of equal rights; If it
represents an arbitrary system that cannot be based on a presumed consent; If income tax tries
to tax income which does not contain the most essential component – accession to wealth. In
such cases, the courts should be called upon to review the tax’s constitutionality.
The Taxing Clause contains much more than it appears at first glance. First, it means that only
the Congress has the power to lay taxes. The Congress represents, of course, the people. As
mentioned already, “no taxation without representation” is not a formal requirement or
demand. It signifies the idea of freedom, and personal property. No citizen will be asked to pay
for the public goods and services without consent. Hence, any tax should be levied only if the
33

See inter alia Y. Margalioth, E. Sulganik, R. Eldor, Y. M. Edrey. "A Cost of Tax Planniing, 5 Review of Law &
Economics, (1) 155 (2009).
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assumption that the public, the taxpayers, provides its collective consent to pay the tax is
reasonable.
Second, our agents should only impose a tax for broad yet confined purposes - “common
defense and general welfare.” Thus, tax laws are not immune from judicial review. Like any
other legislation, the power to impose taxes is restricted by constitutional limitations. Though it
is extremely difficult to define “General Welfare” and identify other governmental goals, yet
the substantive rule is clear, though its implementation might be very complicated and
deserves some sophisticated analysis.
2) The Constitutional Right Not to Pay without Consent.
As already suggested, the Taxing Clause makes a fascinating human rights claim: No person
should pay any tax without the presume consent. When a tax payment is made to the
government, the required consent is both collective and constructive, assuring that a law is
enacted by the public’s agents at the Congress who authorized the payment. In other words,
the political parties offer their platforms and we, the public, vote for a certain one and affirm it.
Every year, the elected government has to present the annual budget to the public. This bill
includes the proposed public goods and services the government intends to provide, and
specifies their price – the cost to the public. If we do not approve the budget—through our
representative agents in the Congress—then the elected government is not allowed to function
– a government shutdown. This is the constitutional reflection of the basic rule “No Taxation
Without Representation”. Since representation is not a merely formal concept but rather
expresses the voters’ approval, then the substantive rule means: ”No Taxation Without
Consent”.
We argue further that the said presumption - the consent to pay tax - holds as long as the tax
follows/fits some characteristics. The main characteristics are those that have been accepted
since the writing of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. 34 A good tax system has to follow these
maxims:
a) Equity: The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government,
as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy
under the protection of the state.35
b). Certainty and non-capricious: The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be
certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid,
ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor.

34

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, book v. ch. ii. (1776) available on line
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/smith-adam/works/wealth-of-nations/book05/ch02b.htm
35
Note that the above sentence expresses in our understanding the view that the greater the economic ability of the
taxpayer the more he or she enjoys the public goods and services of the government provides. In other words the tax
is levied according to the benefit the taxpayer enjoys the good and services; Economic ability - as a Easily
measurable - is the measure of benefit.
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c) The taxpayer's convenience: Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in
which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.
d) Efficiency: Every tax ought to be contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets
of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public
treasury of the state.
These four preconditions/requirements (maxims) were written before the constitutional era and it
is possible that even in the absence of an orderly and systematic thinking pattern of "human
rights". The adaptation of these maxims to contemporary time leads to some modern
elaborations:
The question of equity is traditionally examined in accordance with principles of nondiscriminatory rules measured mainly be horizontal and vertical equity.
Certainty and non-arbitrariness should be achieved by subordinating the tax authorities to act
objectively, and be subject to the principles of the rule of law on the one other hand, and through
recognition of human rights, judicial review and the protection of minority from government and
powerful groups, which might find the way to introduce to the tax system too many favorable
and unjustified tax expenditures on the other hand.
Efficiency refers not only to the tax administration but also to the considerations of optimal tax,
which were developed, as stated about, some 50 years ago.
Convenience of paying also refers to the issue of realization of income and the economic
possibility that the taxpayer possesses for the payment of tax.
If these maxims are the basis underlying the public's consent to pay tax, and the public's consent
is indeed a condition for the constitutionality of tax laws, it follows that these preconditions may
serve as guiding principles for judicial review of tax legislation.
The conclusion that the tax is based on the taxpayers’ consent to pay is a significant one. It
brings in an important factor to the legal and constitutional discussion. When the Congress
imposes duties and limitations there is an assumption that under terms of the Social Contract
we have agreed to those duties and limitations. Yet, it may be in rare and unusual
circumstances, that Congress deviates from the “terms of agency” and legislates a provision
that a reasonable person cannot be assumed to have agreed to and accepted. In case the
enacted tax legislation law is so unreasonable, the assumption of consent has no merit nor
basis. For example, the tax law may be extremely unfair, decreases the taxpayer’s welfare
without due consideration/compensation, or creates unjust discrimination. In case the taxpayer
indeed is able to satisfy the burden and provides hard evidence that he or she does not receive
a fair return for her tax payments, the consent assumption is no longer valid and she may have
a constitutional right not to pay the unjustified tax.
.
We would also argue that in some other unusual cases, when the government fails to provide
its public goods and services to a certain area, the population of this area should not bear the
same tax burden as the rest of the nation’s taxpayer. Assume there is a remote border town.
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Due to its hostile neighbors, the state suffers occasionally from enemy attacks. The enemy
constantly shells the town, hence the daily life is totally ruined: The educational system does
not function, trade and business activity is significantly down, free movement is restricted, and
the property and the life of the town’s residents are in jeopardy. In such a situation, is it still
sensible to assume that the town’s residents agree to pay taxes, even though they do not enjoy
the basic goods and services? Do they have to pay the same amount of tax as the other safe
towns’ residents? Don’t they have the constitutional right for paying less since they get less, or
at least they should not be obligated to pay the full amount of tax until the government takes
the necessary steps/precaution to restore peace?
Another example is the deduction for casualty losses. Such losses occur, in most of the time,
due to the government’s failure to provide satisfactory public services. Suppose an innocent
bystander is affected by a hostile, terrorist, criminal action or natural disaster and suffers
significant damage. The chances that he can collect damages through a civil suit are actually
none. Is he entitled to tax relief or government compensation? After all, the
government/administration failed to provide the most important public services: preventing
criminal or hostile activity and protecting our personal security and private property. The
deductibility of the casualty losses in such cases, might be a reasonable means to ease or
answer these questions.
Another example relates to the inhabitants of some parts of Louisiana who suffered from
hurricane Katrina and from the inefficiency of the government that failed to provide sufficient
assistance. They paid their taxes in order that the government will provide them with
reasonable protection in any circumstance. Since they did not enjoy this protection, should they
be granted some tax relief? Note, that under the current system those taxpayers who suffer
economic casualty indeed pay a lesser amount of tax due to the deductibility of casualty and
theft losses under code section 165(c)(3). The question whether such deductions are sufficient
or the taxpayers should receive an additional tax relief is beyond our point.
The above examples demonstrate the basic requirement of taxation: no taxpayer is expected to
pay taxes without consent. The consent is assumed as long as the taxpayer receives quid pro
que consideration - the benefit derived from the public goods and services. If the benefit is
missing, the taxpayer is entitled to a tax relief that should reflect the absent of the benefit.

3) Tax and the Right to a Dignified Minimum Standard of Living
Any tax system that does not leave the taxpayer with a dignified minimum standard of living
probably violates the constitutional right to human dignity.36
36

See McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, European Journal of International
Law 19(4); NYU L. Rev., https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/NYULawReview-Volume95-Issue-6-Oronoz-Rodriguez.pdf.

17
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2021
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3771017

17

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 175 [2021]

Some scholars draw a line between negative-passive rights and a positive–active rights. The
former mean that the government should not violate the right by driving the human below a
certain level of poverty. The latter means that the government is obligated to assure that any
member of society has the dignified minimum standard of living and when needed, it is
obligated to actively provide the minimum standard of living (“second generation human
rights”). Note though, that the line between those types is much thinner than it seems.
Anyhow, since we deal here with tax legislation, we confine our major discussion to a passivenegative human right, i.e. the government should not violate this right by taxing a person and
leaving him or her without enough means that guarantee a minimum standard of living. After
all, human rights include, by definition the right to survive. As the economist Arthur Okun
expressed the idea in a simple yet clear and precise way:
"While I am not persuaded by the argument for many proposed new rights, the
case for a right to survival is compelling.The assurance of dignity for every
member of the society requires a right for a decent existence – to a minimum
standard of nutrition, health care and other essential of life. Starvation and
dignity do not mix well. The principle that the market should not legislate life
and death is a cliché. I do not know anyone today who would disagree, in
principle, that every person, regardless of merit or ability to pay, should receive
medical care and food in the face of serious illness or malnutrition. Attitudes
about this issue have changed dramatically during the past century..."37
Indeed, most personal income taxation systems around the world have their own version of
leaving the individual with an amount suitable enough to enable him or her and their family to
maintain a basic standard of living. The US tax system reaches this goal by various measures.
Before 2017, the major ones were the personal exemptions [§151] (of the amount of $4,050 in
2016) for a taxpayer and for each dependent. The child tax credit [§ 24], (which is worth in 2016
up to $1,000 per child under the age of 17) [§ 32]. The standard deduction[§ 63(c)], which a
mounts in 2016 for single taxpayer and married couple filing separately the amount of $6,300;
for married couple filing joint returns the total amount of $12,600 to $12,200 for married
taxpayers filing jointly Tax credit for the elderly and the permanent and totally disabled [§ 22],
up to $1,125. for a married couple filling jointly, in 2015; deductibility of medical expenses [§
213(a)]; and the deductibility of casualty losses, Code Sec. 165(c)(3)]. Since 2017, these were
mostly replaced by a larger standard deduction of $24,000 of a couple filing jointly.
In addition, the earned income tax credit, which is refundable “negative income tax” signals
that the right for minimum standard of living has turned in the U.S. to a positive-active right. As
is discussed below, some of the deduction, exemptions and tax credits are phased-out for
taxpayers with higher income.
4) The Constitutional Right to Equality

37

Arthur Okun, Efficiency and Equality – the big trade-off, at pp. 16-17.
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As previously discussed, fairness is the most fundamental requirement for a good tax system.
Horizontal and Vertical Equity express the principles of fairness in taxation, mandating that
equal taxpayers have to pay equal tax payments and different taxpayers ought to pay different
tax payments. The next step is determining the most suitable criteria for equality and
differences between taxpayers.
The most prominent trait of taxation is money, the means that we use for paying our taxes.
Money represents economic value, an economic ability, which is, as stated above, the most
effective and efficient measure of the benefit from the public goods and services provided by
the government. Hence, one may argue that the taxpayers’ economic ability is the right
criterion for equality and differences between taxpayers; taxpayers with equal economic ability
(“ability to pay”) should pay the same tax payments, and taxpayers with different economic
abilities should pay different tax payments.
It should be mentioned though, that in some European countries, the principles of Horizontal
and Vertical equity are no longer theoretical or philosophical concepts, but rather,
constitutional principles mentioned in written constitutions. Furthermore, some foreign
constitutional courts have expressed the notion that the ability to pay is the leading criterion
for measuring equality and difference among taxpayers. According to this approach, different
tax rates levied on the same amount of income, yet from different sources (e.g. labor, capital
income such as interest and capital gain), may be considered a violation of the constitutional
principle of equality.
Keep in mind that different statutory tax rates for different types of income do not necessarily
constitutes unjustified discrimination, but rather serve as a practical compromise as alternative to
complicated calculations of the accurate tax rates. Thus, for example, justifications can be provided
for the low tax rate for capital gains, interest and dividends. An age-old claim is that tax on passive
income, in addition to active income, results a double taxation:38 once on active income (from
labor and business) and once on the fruits of savings from that active income. Needless to say, this
claim is too sweeping and general. Without going into the details, we mention that this claim is
limited to the passive income equals to the market interest rate. Hence instead of calculate
accurately the component that should be exempted, a practical solution of a lower tax rate on the
whole gain is used. A similar idea should apply in order to avoid a triple tax on corporate
earnings.39
38

See inter alia: Bradford, David F. Untangling the Income Tax. (1986); Edward J McCaffery, A new understanding
of tax, 105 Michigan law rev. 807 (2005)` ` Yoseph M. Edrey, "What are 'Capital Gains' and ‘Capital Losses’
Anyway ?" 24 Virginia Tax Rev, 141 (2004-2005).

39

This concept is illustrated by the following example: Suppose that during one year, John Doe invests $5,000 in a C
corporation, which is 100% of the company’s stocks. During that year, the company earns $1,000 and pays corporate
tax (21%). The after-tax company profits are consequently 1,000-t= $790. At the beginning of the second year, John
Doe sells his stock for $6,000. Under current law, John Doe earns Capital gain of $1,000 (assuming tax rate is 20%=
$200)). Furthermore, suppose that a few weeks later, Joanne, who purchased the stock from John for $6,000, receives
a dividend which is equals to the corporate retained earing (1,000-t=$790) and subject to her tax rate of 20% and
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Keep in mind though that different statutory tax rates for different types of income do not
necessarily constitutes unjustified discrimination. Thus, for example, justifications may be
provided for the low tax rate for capital gains, interest and dividends. An age-old claim is that tax
on passive income, in addition to active income, results a double taxation:40 once on active income
(from labor and business) and once on the fruits of savings that active income. Needless to say,
this claim is too sweeping and general. Without going into the details, we mention that this claim
is limited to the passive income equals to the market interest rate. Hence instead of calculate
accurately the gain component that should be exempted, a practical solution of a lower tax rate on
the whole gain is used. A similar idea should apply in order to avoid a triple tax on corporate
earnings.41

5) The Constitution and Retroactive Taxes
Clause 3 of Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution prohibits the Congress from
passing any bill of attainder or ex post facto law. While the term “ex post facto laws” might be
construed to embrace all retrospective laws, in the early case of Calder v. Bull (1798), the
Supreme Court decided that the phrase, as used in the Constitution, applies only to penal and
criminal statutes, and eventually not to tax legislation.
which is taxed again (790*20%= $158). Under such a system, the above corporate earnings of $1,000 are triple-taxed!
(210+200+158=$568). Hence the $1,000 earning is subject to atax rate of 56.8% ! Note that we ignore the distinction
between a real capital gain - created for John from the change in expectations from the corporate's earning in the
future, and the disguised capital gain that comes from the corporate's retained after-tax earnings. Nor are we trying to
accurately calculate the stock's price in light of the fact that the purchaser, John Ann will pay tax on the dividend she
will receive in the future from the company’s retained earnings.
40
See inter alia: Bradford, David F. Untangling the Income Tax. (1986); Edward J McCaffery, A new understanding
of tax, 105 Michigan law rev. 807 (2005)` ` Yoseph M. Edrey, "What are 'Capital Gains' and ‘Capital Losses’
Anyway ?" 24 Virginia Tax Rev, 141 (2004-2005).
41

This concept is illustrated by the following example: Suppose that during one year, John Doe invests $5,000 in a C
corporation, which is 100% of the company’s stocks. During that year, the company earns $1,000 and pays corporate
tax. The after-tax company profits are consequently 1,000-t. At the beginning of the second year, John Doe sells his
stock for $6,000. Under current law, John Doe should report a Capital gain of $1,000. Furthermore, suppose that a
few weeks later, Joanne, who purchased the stock from John for $6,000, receives a dividend which is equals to the
corporate retained earing (1,000-t) which should be tax again from the company - she has to report taxable income of
$650. Under such a system, the above corporate earnings of $1,000 are triple-taxed! Note that we ignore the distinction
between a real capital gain - created for John from the change in expectations from the corporate's earning in the
future, and the disguised capital gain that comes from the corporate's retained after-tax earnings. Nor are we trying to
accurately calculate stock's price in light of the fact that the purchaser, John Ann will pay tax on the dividend it will
receive in the future from the company’s retained earnings. Note that there are another solution to the triple tax: either
John Doe should present a calculation, based on the corporation ledger, that indicates the amount that might be
attributed to the corporate's retained earning that can be allocated to the sold stock, or to allow Jo-Ann to
subtract/deduct from the dividend received the same amount that represents the retained earnings that were subject to
John Doe's tax on his capital gain. For further discussion, see Edrey, what are capital gain……
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Retroactive application of a statute may violate substantive due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. In 1938, the Supreme Court acknowledged that applications of new laws to
preceding taxable years, might be regarded as an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process of law. Yet the Court put a proviso to that rule: “the nature of the tax and
the circumstances in which it is laid [are] so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the
constitutional limitation” (Welch v. Henry, 305 US 134, 147 (1938)).
In 1981, the Supreme Court (U.S. v. Darusmont) demonstrated, once again, its reluctance to
review tax legislation. It concluded that “Current year retroactivity” (application of income tax
statutes to the entire calendar year in which enactment took place), is not a per se violation of
the Due Process Clause. That is in spite of the fact that the taxpayer might have relied on the
old rules and cannot alter pre-enactment transactions in the light of the new rules.
Furthermore, when the new I.R.C of 1986 was enacted, taxpayers realized that there was a
loophole in one of the Code’s provision and took advantage of it. Once the government found
out about it, it announced its intention to amend the provision in order to prevent the abuse.
The legislative process ended only in 1987 but applied retroactively to 1986. Based on the
government’s announcement (warning) and due to the fact that the period of retroactivity was
slightly over one year, the Supreme Court upheld the amendment (Carlton 42): “a retroactive
change in law is constitutional if it is supported by a legitimate purpose furthered by rational
means.” Justice O’Connor added a provisio to the majority opinion since in this case, the
retroactivity period, around a year, was "relatively short period.”3 and any period longer than that
raises “serious constitutional questions.”
A few years later one petitioners (against the state of Washington) and other six (against
Michigan) were required to pay state taxes in Washington and Michigan. The basic question in
both states courts was: can a State, by statute, change its tax laws retroactively for a period of
longer than one year (in the Michigan case – 6 years and the Washington case – 3 years), where
the change was not promptly instituted and where the change was designed to increase state tax
revenue.
The supreme courts in both states dismissed their petitions and all of them filed a cert petition to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The common argument of all the seven petitioners was that the
provisions of the laws that required them to pay these taxes were retroactive and therefore
violated the due process principle. On May 22, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court denied to hear
taxpayer challenges to the retroactive application of changes to States (Washungton and
Michigan) tax laws in Dot Foods v. Washington Department of Revenue.43
Only in a rare case with unusual facts, the Supreme Court invalidated a retroactive application
of a Federal estate tax provision transaction which took place 12 years (!) earlier. [Nichols v.
Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927)].
1.
1.

42

512 U.S. 26 (1994).
Dot Foods, Inc. v. State of Washington, Dep't of Revenue, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, U.S. Supreme Court Dkt.
No. 16-308.

43
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It seems that the underlined rationale to the courts’ general tendency was laid down in Welch
v. Henry’s statement (1938): “[t]ax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested
right in the Internal Revenue Code.” This statement is two folded.
As for the first part – Tax legislation is not a promise - our approach is indeed different. As
indicated a few times already, tax legislation is indeed part of the social contract and is based
on a presumed consent to pay quid pro quo for the public good and services in the broadest
meaning. As with the private market, one party is not allowed to change the term of a contract
unilaterally, so is the case with tax legislation. Each year taxpayers learn (out the deliberation
and the approval of the annual budget) what kind of public goods and services they will get
from the elected government and how much they are going to pay for them. They make serious
decisions based on that price e.g.: whether to work harder or spend more time on leisure; to
make an investment and postpone current consumption; to take higher risks etc. Hence, only in
very rare cases, where the government can argue seriously and sincerely that without a
retroactive legislation the structure of the social contract is in danger, such retroactive tax
legislation should not be upheld. Another exception to the general rule would be when it is very
clear that the tax law’s drafter made a clear mistake which leaves the law ineffective and the
tax authority acknowledges the mistake and announces its intention to fix the problem without
a reasonable delay. In such a case, the amending legislation should be upheld even if the
process takes longer than one taxable year.
In case the tax legislation is done during the taxable year, it should be effective not before the
end of the legislative process. All the transactions that were concluded prior to that date are
subject to the old rule and those that take place after that date will be subject to the new rule.
There are not too many practical problems in having two different sets of rules during one
taxable year.
The second part of the above statement that a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal
Revenue Code - has two meanings. No doubt, taxpayers have a vested right in the Internal
Revenue Code against any retroactive legislation. Yet no taxpayer has the right to act with the
belief that the Code will remain unchanged in the future. If a taxpayer made an economic
decision (business, investment or consumption) on year 1, based on the Code’s provisions in
that year, but she has not materialized/concluded it in that year but in year 2. If in the
beginning of year 2 the law changed, and afterwards she concluded the transaction, then such a
legislation is not a retroactive one. It applies to all the transaction, which were concluded after
the date of the legal change. Tax legislation is like any other variable that any person should
take in consideration that it might change in the future, during the process of contemplating
the deal up to its conclusion.
One may argue though, that our approach is inconsistent. If the tax is based on consent, and if
the Congress decided to change it retroactively, then the public consents to the retroactive
change. This is a wrong argument. The consent to pay taxes is just assumed. The assumption is
valid as long as the tax is based on accepted principles and ideas – the four canons of a good
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tax. Changing the rules of the games after the game is over (i.e. the transaction is concluded),
definitely contradicts the above canons – the tax should be certain and not arbitrary and
consider the convenience of the taxpayer. Furthermore, economic stability is a significant factor
of efficiency. Hence disallowing retroactive tax legislation promotes, in ordinary times,
economic efficiency as well.
6) The Constitution and Punitive Taxes
While there is no clear line that distinguishes taxation from regulation accompanied by a
penalty, it has been widely accepted, that the legislatures cannot use tax law as a punishment.
As noted above, the Supreme Court stated in Welsh v. Henry (1938) that Taxation is neither a
penalty imposed on the taxpayer. One may suspect that in light of the Court of appeals of D.C.’s
approach in the Murphy case, if is taken into extreme, the Congress might have the power to
label a penalty as a tax and legislate it as a tax law in order to bypass the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendment’s Due process requirement. However, the chances for such an occurrence are very
slim. In NFIB, discussed below, the Court took the opposite approach and labeled a penalty a
tax, but in our opinion, this does not shield it from review as a regulatory tax.
7) Is Tax a Confiscatory Payment? Taxes and the Property Right
The “Taking Clause” of the Fifth Amendment instructs: “private property shall not be taken
without just compensation”. A popular, yet a bit superficial observation, may lead to the
conclusion that any tax, by definition, infringes upon property rights, since it transfers wealth
from the taxpayer to the government “without just compensation." This issue has been
answered already by the Supreme Court. As a rule, the Court exempted taxes from a
substantial review under the Takings Clause, and supported the constitutionality of
progressive taxation (e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co (1916)).
Yet not everybody agrees. A notable and assertive voice of opponents is law Prof. Richard
Epstein. Epstein – then, in Chicago – expressed fiercely in his “Takings - Private Property and
the Power of Eminent Domain”, and in some earlier articles, his claim that government actions,
actually all the government redistribution programs, undermine/infringe the Taking Clause.
Under his sweeping and one-sided/short-sighted approach, any government action or even
plans that cause apparent/observable reduction in the value of a person’s asset might be
considered as taking; what might be called “regulatory takings”. Accordingly, any kind of taxes
are forms of taking and should be examined under principles applicable to all other taking, i.e.
does the tax provide just compensation to those taxpayers who are subject to high marginal tax
rates. According to Epstein’s approach, progressive taxation is a clear example of taking without
a just compensation, since it takes wealth from those who have and transfers it to those who
do not have.
There are two major problems with Epstein’s approach. One is the sweeping definition of the
term property. As we argue below, good taxes do not take any private property, neither from
firms nor from households. As for firms, i.e. income producers, Epstein relies quite significantly
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on John Locke’s labor justification of private property. Alas, even if we ignore Locke’s own
famous “provisos” and concentrate on the core of the justification, a clear conclusion emerges.
In modern life no person can sincerely argue that he, she or it operated alone and produced
their wealth without using a critical means/factor of production, namely social capital. Hence
the fruits of the “joint project” go to all the participants/partners, i.e. the taxpayers and the
public as well. Indeed, as is argued below, a good tax is actually a “profit sharing mechanism”
between those who contribute their means of production, including the public and its agentthe government. In other words, taxes, which follow the good tax’ four cannons (a tax must
take into account the rights of the taxpayer; a tax must be certain, predictable and not
arbitrary; a tax must be efficient; and a tax must be fair) are not a taking. They distribute the
proceeds of the joint project to its members who are indeed entitled to their return on their
investment.
As for households, good taxes are the quid pro quo for the benefit of the public goods and
services we, the consumers, enjoy.
The second problem with Epstein’s approach stems from his implied assumption that taxes,
especially progressive ones, do not provide just compensation to the taxpayers who are subject
to higher tax rates. Such assumption ignores Adam Smith’s subtle argument that the ability and
benefit principles do not contradict each other but are actually complementary. As we argue
later on, firms which have higher economic ability – wealth and income production – enjoy
much better the major public goods and services e.g., recognition of private property and its
protection, freedom of contract, the existence of functioning economic markets and
sustainable law and order. Those who don’t have economic ability, barely enjoy those public
goods and services. The same applies to households. The more we have – wealth and
consumption – the greater benefit we enjoy the major public good and services, i.e. security,
law and order, recognition of property’s rights and their protection, regulation on financial
institutes, and economic stability. Hence, those who have more receive a just compensation for
their higher consumption of public goods and services, and rightly pay higher amount of taxes
than those who have less. (F.F.Piven, R. A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: the Functions of
Public Welfare, N.Y. .1971)
The conclusion, which we suggested already above, is that good taxes do provide full
compensation to the taxpayer. Nevertheless, when sufficient arguments and evidence are
provided to support that the taxpayer does not enjoy the public goods and services as the rest
of the community’s members, such a tax might not prevail.
4. The Constitutional Limits on Regulatory Taxes
The Court does not impose too many limits on regulatory taxes either. It has held that—
It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid [under the
Taxing Clause] merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters
the activities taxed. . . . The principle applies even though the revenue obtained
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is obviously negligible . . . or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary. .
. . Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities which
Congress might not otherwise regulate. As was pointed out in Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934): 'From the beginning of our government, the
courts have sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral intent of
effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the constitutional
power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed to their
accomplishment.'”44
In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts used a functional approach in evaluating the authority for the
requirement to pay the “penalty” for violating the individual mandate, and held that the
“penalty” was a tax because (a) it had no penal intent and lacked a scienter requirement, and
(b) because the tax level under the ACA is established based on traditional tax variables such as
taxable income, number of dependents and joint filing status and the tax is collected by the
Internal Revenue Service. Moreover, the Court noted, unlike a normal penalty the cost of the
tax was far outweighed by the cost of obtaining health insurance. Roberts therefore concluded
that the ACA “penalty” was in fact a “tax” authorized by the Taxing Clause.45
Many commentators have criticized this conclusion. As Kyle Logue has written,
If the Court is going to interpret the Constitution as drawing an important
distinction between taxes and regulations (or penalties), a distinction that
permits Congress to achieve some ends through the use of taxes that it cannot
achieve through the use of regulations (because the breadth of the taxing power
is greater than that of the regulatory power), then the Court needs a different
way of distinguishing taxes from regulations. Specifically, I argue that instead of
focusing so much on how coercive an exaction is (in the Court’s view, the more
coercive, the more likely it is to be considered a “penalty” or a “regulation”), the
Court should focus on the primary purpose of the exaction: is it to raise revenue
or to alter behavior? I also argue that the definition of a tax should not include a
requirement that money be paid to the government; rather, it is enough that
there be a mandatory payment of money towards a public purpose. On this
44

United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950). This was not always true. From 1922 to 1936, the Court ruled in
a series of cases that Congress could not accomplish under the Taxing Clause what was beyond the limits of its
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause. See J.W. Bailey v. Drexel Furn. Co., 259 US 20 (1922) (Child
Labor Tax Case): “In the light of these features of the act, a court must be blind not to see that the so called tax is
imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect
and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?” Id., at
37. See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 US 44 (1922); Trusler v. Crooks, 269 US 475 (1926); United States v. Constantine,
296 US 287 (1935); United States v. Butler, 297 US 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 US 238 (1936).
However, when the Court switched its view of the Commerce Clause in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US
379 (1937) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (1937), these decisions became obsolete until
1995, when the Court began to reinstate the limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause. This trend
culminated in NFIB v. Sebelius, in which the Court invalidated the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause
but upheld it under the Taxing Clause.
45
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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alternative understanding of the tax/regulation distinction, it is the individual
mandate itself that has the important characteristics of a tax while the [penalty]
has the characteristics of a penalty or enforcement provision that backs up the
mandate.46
We do not agree that from a constitutional perspective a tax can include a payment to a nongovernmental entity (like an insurance company). The Taxing Clause is clear that “tax” must be
used for revenue raising for the government (“to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States”), which includes all tax whose main purpose
is raising financial resources which are designated to finance the elected government spending
according to the annual budget approved by the public through its agents at the legislative
branch. But we agree that the key constitutional consideration is for the Court to “focus on the
primary purpose of the exaction: is it to raise revenue, or to alter behavior?”.47 When the
primary purpose of a tax provision is not to raise revenue, but rather to change taxpayer
behavior, it is a regulatory payment . Moreover, all tax expenditures, i.e., provisions in the tax
law that deviate from the normative tax base, are regulatory [negative] taxes.
When a tax is a regulatory payment tax, it should not be judged primarily on the basis of the
Taxing Clause. Instead, it should be judged like any regulation under the other provisions of the
Constitution, including in particular the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the
Establishment clause, and the limits on Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Thus,
under this analysis, Chief Justice Roberts was wrong: The ACA “penalty” is a regulatory payment
– under the proposed model a negative Pigovian tax" and therefore it is not authorized by the
Taxing Clause but rather subject to the limits on congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. We disagree with the Chief Justice and the other conservative justices that the
Commerce Clause should invalidate the individual mandate, because (as Justice Ginsburg wrote
in her concurrence/dissent) it addresses a market failure (adverse selection) that does not
apply to, for example, a requirement to eat broccoli. But we agree with the four conservative
dissenters that the Taxing Clause does not save the ACA penalty; luckily, the ACA can stand
without the penalty, as has been shown by developments after the penalty was abolished in
2017.
As one of us has discussed elsewhere, in many democratic countries, regulatory taxes are
subject to a two-step judicial review. First, the court ascertains what is the regulatory purpose
underlying the legislation. Second, the court determines whether the injury to rights such as
equal protection is proportional to the regulatory purpose.The first author has argued that
under this approach many of the larger US tax expenditures would not survive judicial review
because they violate the Equal Protection Clause without a rational basis.48 For example, the
exclusion of premiums for health insurance paid by employers for employees and the lack of
46

Kyle Logue, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Individual Mandate: Thoughts on the Tax/Regulation Distinction, 5
Michigan Bus. Enterp. L. Rev. (2016).

47
48

Logue, supra.
Avi-Yonah, Should US Tax Law be Constitutionalized, supra.
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such a tax benefit for independent contractors is a pure accident of history with no rational
basis and should be deemed unconstitutional. Another example is the exemption for interest
on state and local bonds, which is designed to help states and localities, but in most cases can
be empirically demonstrated by the interest rate to inure to the benefit of taxpayers in the
highest tax bracket. A third example is the home mortgage interest deduction, which is
designed to encourage home ownership, but which has been abolished in other countries with
no adverse effect on home ownership. The list is long.49
Another example of the application of the constitution to tax law is the notorious parsonage
exemption (section 107), which is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. Until recently, it
was difficult to challenge this provision because of standing concerns, but the Seventh Circuit
overcame this difficulty recently.50 While the Court of Appeals upheld the provision on the
merits, the arguments against it are persuasive and it is likely to be challenged again.51
5. Conclusion
In this essay, we have attempted to do three things. First, we define what is a “tax” for
purposes of the Taxing Clause, as amended by the Sixteenth Amendment: It is a payment to the
government either to raise revenue or to redistribute income. A tax that is primarily not for
revenue is a regulatory tax and therefore out of the scope of the Taxing Clause.
Second, we have defined what are the appropriate constitutional limits on pure taxes on the
basis of the idea that taxes in a liberal democracy must be based on the consent of the
taxpayers, and that the taxpayers would not consent to a tax that is not fair or efficient. Third,
we have defined the appropriate constitutional limit on regulatory taxes as a violation of Equal
Protection that is narrowly tailored to a defensible rational regulatory purpose and that does
not offend other constitutional limits like the Commerce or Establishment Clauses and the
Establishment Clause
As stated above, we do not believe that the current Court is up to the task of applying
constitutional analysis to either pure or regulatory taxes, because (a) both require an
investigation into the purpose of legislation, which is anathema to textualists, and (b) the Court
does not have a well-defined doctrine of proportionality to evaluate the extent to which a
violation of a constitutional right is justified by the legislative purpose, as other supreme courts
do. However, the courts are capable to examine several quantitative questions in order to
review tax expenditures. First, did the government perform a proper administrative work
49

For the longer list see Avi-Yonah, Should US Tax Law be Constitutionalized, supra.
On taxpayer standing see Flast v. Cohen (1968), which upheld taxpayer standing to mount Establishment Clause
challenges, but in Winn (2011) the Court restricted this holding, and in FFRF v. Lew (2014) the 7th Circuit followed
suit in rejecting standing. However, the taxpayers persisted and were able to reach the merits in Gaylord v. Mnuchin
(2019), but they lost on the merits because the court wrongly compared section 107 to the generally applicable
exclusion of housing “for the convenience of the employer” in section 119. But this provision is much more limited
that section 107 and does not encompass cash allowances.
51
For a persuasive critique of Gaylord see Adam Chodorow, The Parsonage Exemption, 51 UC Davis L Rev 849
(2018).
50
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before offering the benefit? E.g. what is the goal that the administration sought to achieve?
Will it sustain a judicial review, or is it violating constitutional principles. The next step is maybe
not a pure legal question, however even conservative Justices have used expert/pr opinions of
amicus curiae who are able to show through quantitative and empirical data whether the
administration has done proper staff work to assess what benefit American society will benefit
from; Is the goal clear and defined; what is its estimated cost or whether it may achieve the
goal - ex post or ex ante; whether the means - tax expenditure is approximately equal to
accomplish the stated goal; whether the revenue loss is not significantly higher than needed, as
the Treasury can - and even must - quantify the tax losses that the specific tac expenditure
causes to the government.
No need to say that such review will improve dramatically the administration, There is no need
to detail how such a review will dramatically improve the Administration's performance,
increase the decision-making process and lead to great transparency of the administration for
the benefit of taxpayers. But we hope that this essay contributes to reopening the debate on
the application of the Constitution to tax law that has been mostly closed in the century that
has passed since the Court last invalidated a federal income tax law on constitutional grounds.
On a more practical level, the fact that the Court is not equipped to conduct constitutional
review of tax legislation does not mean that the constitutional inquiry is worthless. Congress is,
too, charged with upholding the Constitution, and Congress can ask when considering tax
legislation whether it is a pure or a regulatory tax and, if the latter, whether it is constitutional.
Congress also has the requisite tax expertise. In fact, this could be a new process for the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation: For every new tax legislation, the Joint Committee should ask
not just how much it costs or what its distributive effects are, but also whether it is
constitutional (admittedly, this would require hiring more lawyers and fewer economists). A
report along these lines may persuade members of Congress to refrain from some of the more
egregious violations of the constitution found in current regulatory tax legislation, and perhaps
encourage it to regulate more via direct legislation or subsidies than by the ever expanding use
of the tax code for non-revenue purposes.
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